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RECENT DECISIONS
Landlord and Tenant-PATENT DEFECTS IN A COMMON ARA-Aragona
Enterprises v. Miller, 213 Va. 298, 191 S.E.2d 804 (1972).
When a landlord retains control of a portion of the premises for common
use by multiple tenants, he must exercise ordinary care to keep that com-
mon area in a condition reasonably safe for its intended use.' Since the land-
lord incurs no liability when the premises are under the exclusive control
of one tenant,2 the prerequisites of liability for an injury resultig from a
defective condition in a common area are that the landlord must have re-
served the area for common use for himself and the tenants, and that he
must have retained control of the area himself rather than have vested it in
one tenant or the tenants in common.
3
Jurisdictions are split on the question of the landlord's liability for an
injury resulting from an open and obvious condition existing at the time
of the letting.4 Some would obligate the landlord to use ordinary care to
149 Am. JuR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 810 (1970); RRrATEmENT (SEco N) oF TORTS
§ 360 (1965); Annor., 25 AJL.R. 2d 364 (1952). For a statement of Virginia law see
Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732 (1968).
2 Under the common law a landlord makes no implied warranty of suitability where
exclusive possession of the entire premises is transferred to a tenant. Absent fraud or
misrepresentation, a tenant takes the premises as he finds them, and a landlord owes no
duty as to conditions existing at the time of the letting. 49 Am. JuR. 2d Landlord and
Tenant § 768 (1970); 1 H. TwrANY, REA. PRoPERTY § 99 (3rd ed. 1939); Note, Land-
lord and Tenant: Defects Existing at the Thnme of the Lease, 35 IND. L. J. 361 (1960);
accord, Luedtke v. Phillips, 190 Va. 207, 211, 56 SE.2d 80, 82-83 (1949); Caudill v. Gib-
son Fuel Co, 185 Va. 233, 239-41, 38 S.E.2d 465, 469 (1946). The primary exception
to this rule of caveat emptor appears in the lease of furnished premises for a temporary
purpose. See Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Furnished Prem-
ises for Short Tern: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. Ric-. L. Ray. 322 (1969).
3 See 52 C. J. S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (6) (1968); 4D PERSONAL INJuRY, Ac-
TIONS • DEFENSES • DAMAGES § 1.05 14J [a] (1971); cf. Wagman v. Boccheciampe, 206
Va. 412, 416, 143 SE.2d 907, 909 (1965) (no liability where common area is not put
to its intended use); Berlin v. Wall, 122 Va. 425, 436, 95 S. 394, 398 (1918) (landlord
not liable where he retains control but clearly indicates that area is not reserved for
common use). See also Comment, Landlord's Control of Leased Premises, 11 Clrv-
MAR. L. REv. 151 (1962).
4 See 52 C. J. S. § 417 (6) (1968); 4D PERSONAL INJiuRY, AcoNs - DEFEN s s DAMAGES
§ 1.05 [41 [a] (1971). But see 1 H. TIFFANY, REaL. PROPERTY § 109 (3rd ed. 1939)
(no mention of a split in authority). To imply that there are two clear cut views
on the issue of a landlord's liability for patent defects existing in a common area at the
time of the letting is misleading. It would be more accurate to say that there are two
approaches to the problem. See notes 5 and 6 infra.
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keep the common area in safe condition without regard to the existence of
the defect when the lease became effective.6 Others follow the Massachu-
setts rule, which holds that the tenant takes the use of the common area as
he finds it, and that the landlord is bound to keep it in a condition only
as safe as that which existed at the inception of the tenancy.6
In one approach, the landlord-tenant relationship is controlled by the law of prop-
erty which views a lease as a sale of an estate. This traditional approach evolved in
the rural, agrarian society of the past where possession of land was the aim of the
bargain, and it resulted in the doctrine of caveat emptor. On the other hand, the
current approach to a landlord's liability for a common area seems to be a part of the
modem developments in the law which recognize that the traditional view is inade-
quate for a multi-dwelling urban society. See generally Comment, Judicial Expansion
of Tenants' Private Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residen-
tial Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 489 (1971); Comment, Protection of Tenants:
The Extent of the Landlord's Duty, 1971 L. & Soc. ORDER 612.
The current law in Virginia is probably representative of the position of most
jurisdictions. While Virginia pays lip service to the modem approach concerning a
landlord's duty towards a common area, it has not yet discarded the influence of
caveat emptor. Compare Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp, 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732
(1968), with Aragona Enterprises v. Miller, 213 Va. 298, 191 S.E.2d 804 (1972).
5 This approach represents a severance of the law of property's influence on a land-
lord's obligation towards a common area. A landlord has a duty to exercise ordinary
care to keep a common area reasonably safe for its intended use, which is analogous
to that imposed on a possessor of land who, for some benefit, expressly or impliedly
invites persons to enter thereon. Any person lawfully upon a common area is afforded
the status of an invitee of the landlord. As such, an invitee does not stand in the
tenant's shoes, and the tenant's knowledge of an unsafe condition existing at the time
of the lease is not imputed to him. Thus, the effective date of a particular tenant's
lease is not determinant in. fixing a landlord's duty. Under this view, a landlord is
not an insurer of the safety of his tenants and guests, because he is required only to
exercise reasonable care, and he can defeat the recovery of an injured person by show-
ing contributory negligence. See 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 811 (1970);
52 C. J. S. Landlord and Tenant § 417 (6) (1968); W. PROSSER, HaNDBOOK OV nm LAW
OF TORTS § 63 (4th ed. 1971); REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTs § 360, Explanatory
Notes § 360, comment b, at 251 (1965). See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Schaible,
375 P.2d 201 (Alas. 1962); Presson v. Mountain State Properties, Inc., 18 Ariz. App. 176,
501, P.2d 17 (1972); Harper v. Vallejo Housing Authority, 104 Cal. App. 2d 621, 232
P.2d 262 (1951); Williamson v. Wilmington Housing Authority, 208 A.2d 304 (Del.
1965); Rahn v. Beurskens, 66 Ill. App. 2d 423, 213 N.E.2d 301 (1966); Primus v.
Bellevue Apartments, 241 Iowa 1055, 44 N.W.2d 347 (1950).
6 See, e.g., Keeney v. Di Cicco, 353 Mass. 773, 234 N.E.2d 292 (1968) (no liability
where tenant failed to show what the condition of the common area was at the time
of the letting); Wheeler v. Boston Housing Authority, 341 Mass. 510, 170 N.E.2d 465
(1960) (tenant's child could not recover where condition existed at time of the let-
ting); Marsh v. Goldstein, 341 Mass. 83, 167 N.E.2d 158 (1960) (new tenancy at will
created when new landlord acquired title, although tenant had no knowledge of con-
veyance; new landlord was not liable to guest of tenant injured by defect which existed
before conveyance); 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 109 (3rd ed. 1939); Annot, 25
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The Virginia Supreme Court faced this split of authority in the recent
case of Aragona Enterprises v. Miller.7 The plaintiff in Aragona recovered
damages in a wrongful death action against the defendant, owner of an
apartment complex, when a 20 month old child drowned in a drainage canal
60 feet from her parents' apartment. The defendant's property line and the
center line of a 100 foot drainage easement of the City of Virginia Beach
coincided with the middle of the 70 foot wide canal. From the apartment
units to the steep canal bank was an open grass area maintained by the de-
fendant. The plaintiff contended that Aragona was negligent in failing to
exercise reasonable care to maintain the area between the apartment units
and the canal in a safe condition by not erecting a barrier to prevent chil-
dren from falling into the canal.8
The Virginia Supreme Court, reversing the judgment for the plaintiff,
held that "[a] landlord is not liable to a tenant or to members of his fam-
ily, whether adult or infant, [for injury] resulting from an open and obvious
condition existing at the inception of the tenancy, and of which the tenant
knew or had means of knowing equal to the landlord." 9 The court also
rested its decision on its finding that the canal was not in a reserved area
controlled by the landlord, and that the landlord, who did not create this
A.L.R. 2d 364, 387 (1952) (discussion of Massachusetts rule). By this traditional ap-
proach, the duty and liability of a landlord are determined by the landlord-tenant
relationship rather than the law of invitation. A landlord is obligated only to exercise
reasonable care to keep the common area in repair, or in as safe a condition as existed
at the inception of the tenancy. A tenant takes a common area as he finds it or as
it reasonably appears to be, no matter how patent and dangerous the condition. Those
who lawfully enter by a tenant's right are deemed to have no greater right against
the landlord than the tenant. Thus, a tenant, his family, or guest can recover from a
landlord only by showing that the unsafe condition did not exist at the time of the letting.
7213 Va. 298, 191 S.E.2d 804 (1972) (3-2 decision) (Cochran & Carrico J. J., dis-
senting).
8 The child disappeared from her parents' apartment while her mother was talking
to a neighbor at the door and twenty minutes later was found in the drainage canal.
The facts indicate that the city drainage easement extended fifteen feet from the canal
bank into the grass area maintained by Aragona. Although the manager of the apart-
ment complex admitted knowing that this area between the apartment units and the
canal was used by the tenants, he testified that such use was neither permitted nor
denied. Id. at 299, 191 S.E.2d at 805. 'Elsewhere in the apartment complex a recrea-
tional area [swimming pool deck] had been extended by Aragona over the canal it-
self." Id. at 304, 191 SE.2d at 808. Thus, Aragona owned the land up to the -middle
of the canal, and was free to use it subject to the city's easement.
9 d. at 299-300, 191 S.E.2d at 805. The court cites Berlin v. Wall, 122 Va. 425, 437,
438, 95 S.E. 394, 398 (1918), as a source of this rule. However, the rule seems more a
quote of Berlin's statement of a landlord's duty, towards premises in a tenant's posses-
sion than a summary of the text at the pages actually cited. See Berlin v. Wall, 122 Va.
425, 436, 95 S.E. 394, 398 (1918).
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obvious danger, had no duty to insure the safety of the tenants or their
children.10
In sharp contrast, the dissenting opinion concluded that while the tenant
would be barred from recovery due to his knowledge of an open and ob-
vious danger, any negligence of. the parent-tenant cannot be imputed to the
child. It reasoned that the result of the majority's holding imposes "[tjhe
bar of assumption of the risk ... upon children who are incapable of know-
ing or appreciating the risk.":"
The reasoning behind the majority opinion follows the Massachusetts
rule,12 while that of the dissent more nearly reflects the current view. The
decision halts a trend in Virginia case law away from the previously adopted
Massachusetts rule.'5 By imputing the assumption of the risk and contribu-
10 213 Va. at 303, 191 S.E.2d at 807. The court could have denied recovery either
on its rule that a tenant's family stands in his shoes, or on its finding that the canal
was not a reserved common area. Since a determination that a particular portion of
the premises is retained by a landlord for common use is a prerequisite of any duty
on his part, the court need not have issued its rule concerning the tenant's family. See
note 3 supra.
11Id. at 303-04, 191 S.E.2d at 809. The dissenting opinion recognized that while a
landlord is not an insurer of his tenant's safety, he still owes a duty to those lawfully
using a common area to exercise ordinary care to keep such place in a reasonably
safe condition. It did not accept the majority's position that this obligation excluded
a tenant's family where an unsafe condition was patent at the time of the lease. In
fact, the dissent clearly pointed out that such a result is contrary to Virginia law on
the negligence of children. See Morris v. Peyton, 148 Va. 812, 821, 139 S.E. 500, 502-03
(1927) (a child under seven years of age is incapable of negligence); Tugman v. River-
ide & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc., 144 Va. 473, 477, 479-81, 132 SE. 179, 180-81
(1926) (what is an obvious danger to an adult may not be obvious to a child; negli-
gence of a parent cannot be imputed to his child).
'
2 Although Aragona indicates that Virginia follows the Massachusetts rule, this
does not seem to be entirely true. The court would apparently place only a tenant's
family in his shoes, while it would allow invitees, not in a tenant's family, to recover
whether or not the patent condition existed at the time of the letting. See City of
Richmond v. Grizzard, 205 Va. 298, 136 S1.2d 827 (1964), where although the defect
was not patent at the time of the letting, the court, in holding the landlord liable,
stressed the invitee status of the plaintiff and stated the duty of a landlord in language
that did inot indicate a different result had the condition been obvious. See note 14
infra.
, Is Virginia adopted the Massachusetts rule in Berlin v. Wall, 122 Va. 425, 95 SE.
394 (1918), where the court posed two grounds for denying recovery where an injury
to a tenant's child resulted from a patent danger which existed at the time of the
letting. First, the court stated the then general rule;
The landlord is under no obligation to the tenant to change the mode of con-
strition of the passageways, stairs, or platforms, used in common by the tenants,
and to construct them upon a different plan, in order to make them more
safe, provided the mode of construction wag a pparent at the time of the letting.
His obligation has been said to be merely to keep such a place 'in such condi-
tion as it was in, or purported to be in, at the time of the letting,' meaning there-
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tory negligence of a parent-tenant to his child, it contradicts Virginia law
concerning the negligence of infants and does not conform to the current
rationale concerning the basis of the landlord's liability for a common area.
The trend away from the Massachusetts rule took the form of moving
-the question of a landlord's liability from the realm of the law of landlord
and tenant into the law of invitation as it applies to occupiers of land.' 4 It
by such condition as it would appear to be in to a person of ordinary observation,
and having reference to the obvious condition of things existing at the time of
the letting. Id. at 437, 95 SE. at 398.
The second basis for denying recovery in Berlin was the court's finding that while
-the unsafe condition was controlled by the landlord, it was not an area reserved for
-common use. Id. at 432, 95 SE. at 398. However, the court, not satisfied with the mere
fact that the area was not reserved for use, stressed that the landlord had exercised
reasonable care to make the common room safe by erecting a barrier around the dan-
gerous area. The court distinguished the situation in Berlin from the case where a
landlord was held liable because no such barrier was erected. Id. at 433, 95 SE. at 398.
In effect, Berlin was really decided on the fact that the landlord had exercised reason-
able care and had no duty to protect the tenant and his family when the landlord's
safety measures were disregarded.
14Since Berlin, the court has not stated the duty of a landlord towards a common
area in the restrictive language found therein. See note 13 supra. In Williamson v.
Wellman, 156 Va. 417, 158 SE. 777 (1931), the court recognized that the duty a land-
lord owes to a person using a common area under the law in Massachusetts was not
in accord with the duty imposed in other states. In what seems to be a break with
the Massachusetts rule the court stated without analyzing the distinction, that it would
apply the "law" to the facts before it. The court noted that a landlord who chose to
utilize a common approach to multiple units did so to lessen the expense of providing
separate ingress and egress, and that the tenants and all who had dealings with them
were required to use this common approach. This situation imposed a duty on a land-
lord analogous to that imposed upon any owner of land who invited persons to enter
thereon. Id. at 422-23, 158 S.. at 778-79. Thus, the court in Williamson defined a
landlord's duty without the limitations found in the Massachusetts rule:
A landlord who rents out parts of a building to various tenants reserving the
halls, stairways and' other approaches for the common use of his tenants, is
under an implied duty to use reasonable care to keep such places in a reasonable
safe condition, and is liable for injuries to persons ... for his failure to Perform
that duty. id. at 425, 158 SE. at 779.
This liability was seen as extending to anyone free from contributory negligence. '7d.
While the defect in Williamson was found not to be obvious, the court implied that it
was common knowledge that a wooden platform would'decay. Id. at 426, 158 Sl. at
780.
The court continued to express the duty of a landlord towards a common area- un"I
restricted by the peculiarity of the Massachusetts rule. See Langhorne Road Aait'-
ments, Inc. v. Bisson, 207 Va. 474, 150 SE.2d 540 (1966) (court rejected Massachusetts
rule as it applies to accumulations of snow on common areas); Wagman. v, Bocche-
ciampe, 206 Va. 412, 143 SE.2d 907 (1965) (decision rested on fact that child did not
put stairway railing to its intended use rather than Berlin xeasoning t1at railing ex-
isted at inception of tenancy); City of Richmond v. Grizzard, 205 Va. 298, 136 S.E.24
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culminated in Taylor v. Virginia Construction Corp.,15 where the court rec-
ognized that the right of a person lawfully using a common area to recover
for injury caused by a landlord's negligence was independent of the tenant's
rights. In Taylor, the court held that the liability of a landlord was derived
from the invitee status of the person who accepted a landlord's invitation
to use a common area. The landlord's duty was seen as analogous to that of
the owner of land who invited persons to enter thereon. 16
In Aragona the majority opinion expressed an unwillingness to make a
landlord an insurer of the safety of his tenants and their children1 7 While
recognizing that children are adventurous, and that the dangers of canals,
busy streets and rivers naturally attract them, it failed to adequately dis-
tinguish between those situations where a danger exists on adjoining land,
and the situation in Aragona where the potential danger existed on the land-
lord's property.' The difference is the status given to the injured party;
this status determines the liability by designating the degree of care owed. 19
This distinction should be especially important if the landlord's liability
for injury in the common area is not derived from his relationship with the
tenant, but rather as previously held, is independent of whether he would
827 (1964) (invitee status of persons lawfully using common area afftmed; court
relied on RESTATRMENT OF TORTS § 360, which is contrary to Massachusetts rule);
Revell v. Deegan, 192 Va. 428, 433, 65 S.E.2d 543, 545 (1951) (landlord not liable because
he did not have actual or constructive knowledge of defect).
15 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732 (1968). In Taylor, the court held a landlord liable where
a tenant's child injured his hand in a defective entrance door, a condition that did not
exist at time of letting. An exculpatory clause in the tenant's lease was ruled inapplicable
to the common area, and not binding on the child whose cause of action was personal
to him.
'I Id. at 80, 161 S2.2d at 735. Taylor states that a tenant's child is not restricted in
his right to recover because of the lease between the tenant and the landlord, and
that the child's cause of action is derived from the landlord's invitation to use the
common area. This contrasts sharply with the result of Aragona, which seems to es-
tablish a "privity of family" by which a tenant's family is bound by the lease.
17 Te court in Aragona concerned itself with the burden that it would impose on
landlords whose apartment complex adjoined a beach, ocean, or other potential danger.
213 Va. 298, 303, 191 SE.2d 804, 807.
18 See Jones v. United States, 241 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1957) (unsafe condition existed
on the land of an adjoining property owner); Golf Club Co. v. Rothstein, 97 Ga. App.
128, 102 SHE.2d 654, aff'd 214 Ga. 187, 104 S.E.2d 83 (1958) (ravine situated on land-
lord's property); Roberson v. City of Kinston, 261 N.C. 135, 134 S.E.2d 193 (1964)
(drainage ditch not located on land of landlord); Fitch v. Selwyn Village, Inc, 234
N.C. 632, 68 S.E.2d 255 (1951) (creek located on the landlord's property).
'9 Where an unsafe condition exists on a landlord's property, persons lawfully thereon
have the status of invitee or licensee, and a landlord owes a corresponding degree of
care. However, where an unsafe condition exists on land adjoining that of a landlord,
it is the owner of such land, not the landlord, upon whom the law places an obligation.
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be liable to the tenant.20 In effect, the majority opinion ignored the trend
in Virginia law which established that as to a common area members of a
tenant's family do not stand in the tenant's shoes with respect to the duties
and liabilities of a landlord.21
Posing another ground to deny liability, the court in Aragona held that
the canal and its embankment were neither intended for use by the tenants
nor part of a reserved common area.- While this is probably true, the grass
area leading up to the bank was intended for use, and the canal constituted
a danger to those using it. Certainly a landlord would not intend that chil-
dren use or even come in contact with such a potential danger. However,
the law requires that a landlord exercise due care to make such area safe,
not merely assume that persons will avoid unsafe conditions.23
The dissenting opinion impliedly accepted the trend of Virginia case law
away from the Massachusetts rule, and concluded that the jury had a basis
to find Aragona negligent. 24 Although the dissent acknowleged that as a
20 If the Massachusetts rule is followed, it does not matter whether the defect exists
on the landlord's property or that adjoining it because there is no duty as to a condi-
tion that is obvious at the time of the letting. However, where the landlord's duty is
based upon the law of invitation he could be liable for injury caused by an unsafe
condition regardless of when it came into existence.
2lThis result could cause injustice in a multi-dwelling unit situation with a high
turn-over of tenants. If a landlord allowed an obvious, unsafe condition to develop
in a common area, the family of tenant "A" who moved in before the defect arose
could recover for an injury caused by the defect, but the family of tenant "B" whose
lease became effective while the defect existed would be automatically barred from
recovery.
Another problem which may be encountered in applying the rule in Aragona is that
of defining the scope of the family. Does the category include a maiden aunt living
with a tenant who contributes a small amount for her room and board, or an emanci-
pated child who returs to take Sunday dinner with his family? What about the fairly
common situation where several single persons rent an apartment but only one of them
actually signs the lease? Accepting that invitees not in a tenant's family may recover
where a patent defect existed at the time of the letting, it seems illogical to arbitrarily
bar the recovery of a class as artificial as a tenant's family.
22213 Va. at 303, 191 S-E.2d at 807.
23This is the thought behind the court's reasoning in its second ground for not hold-
ing the landlord liable in Berlin v. Wall. See note 13 supra.
In Primus v. Bellevue Apartments, 241 Iowa 1055, 44 N.W.2d 347 (1950), a landlord
was held liable when a child caught his hand in an unguarded gear box of a common
washing machine. The child recovered because the landlord did not exercise ordinary
care to maintain the common area in a reasonably safe condition for its intended use.
It seems highly unlikely that the landlord in Primus could have escaped liability by
merely saying that he did not reserve the gear box for children to place their hands
into. Yet, this type defense seems to have been approved in Aragona.
24213 Va. at 304, 191 S.E.2d at 808. The dissenting opinion recognized that the
majority decision would force tenants and their families to assume the risk of any and
all obvious conditions, no matter how great the danger or foreseeable the injury:
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general rule a tenant would be barred from recovering damages due to an
obvious danger existing at the inception of the tenancy, it recognized that
in Virginia what is obvious to an adult may not be obvious to an infant,
and that a child less than seven years old is incapable of negligence. Further,
it noted that the negligence of a parent cannot be imputed to his child.25
Thus, the decision rendered in Aragona affects the law in Virginia as to
the right of a tenant's family to recover for an injury caused by patent
defects in the common area, by imputing the negligence of a parent-tenant
to his child, and rejecting the established principle that the right of a per-
son lawfully using a common area to recover for injury caused by a land-
lord's negligence is not derived from the tenant's right. The court decreed
that members of the tenant's family stand in his shoes as to obvious and
open dangers existing at the inception of the tenancy, but apparently would
allow all others rightfully upon a common portion of the premises to re-
cover independent of the tenant's knowledge of an unsafe condition.26 The
unfortunate result is that a landlord can avail himself of the rule of Aragona
to defeat recovery when similar defects injure a tenant's child, while he
must prove contributory negligence to defeat recovery by an adult guest.
The duty of a landlord to his tenant's children should be no less than his
obligation to any other adult or child invited to use the common area. The
majority has concerned itself with the task of not making a landlord the
insurer of the children of his tenant's safety, and in effect has made "the
tenants in such a complex insurers of the safety of their infant children as
to any open and obvious danger existing at the inception of their leases, re-
gardless of the landlord's negligence." 27
D.M.M.
The duty of a landlord to his tenants' children for unreasonably hazardous con-
ditions should reflect the degree of foreseeability of danger to the children, who
because of their tender age and immaturity cannot discover or appreciate the
risk, and the cost or burden of preventing such accidents in comparison with
the risk to the children. [cite] Here the hazard to children of falling in the canal
was foreseeable and could have been eliminated or greatly reduced at relatively
slight expense to the landlord. Id. 305, 191 S.E.2d at 809.
25 Id. at 304-05, 191 S.E.2d at 808. If the court was not imputing the negligence of
the parent to his child, then there must be some form of "privity of family" which
makes a child a party to the lease. See note 16 supra.
26 See note 12 supra.
27 213 Va. at 305, 191 S.E.2d at 809.
